When …rms are heterogeneous, there may not exist a common collusive price that raises all …rms'pro…ts. However it is shown that there always exists a common minimum price that raises all …rms'pro…ts.
Introduction
In practice, one of the primary challenges faced by …rms desiring to collude is that they are often highly asymmetric. Firms can have di¤erent products and costs and this manifests itself in terms of di¤erent prices and quantities under competition. The stability of collusion then depends on …nding a collusive outcome (and a strategy) such that all of these asymmetric …rms …nd it incentive compatible to adhere to it. At a minimum, each …rm's pro…t under collusion must exceed that which it earned when …rms were competing. If …rms can coordinate on any price vector then this latter condition is not a problem as there will always exist a collection of prices that makes all …rms better o¤.
The problem that arises in practice is that agreeing to and coordinating on a di¤erent price for each …rm will probably require extensive communication among …rms which enhances the possibility that they will be discovered and convicted for engaging in unlawful collusion. An alternative is for …rms to coordinate in a simpler manner that would require far less communication and coordination. One well-documented approach is price leadership whereby a …rm takes the role of price leader, selects a price, and then all …rms match that This research has been conducted with the …nancial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-1148129).
price. While that will surely lead to higher pro…ts for all …rms when …rms are similar in cost and demand, that is not true when …rms are su¢ ciently di¤erent. For example, suppose …rms have di¤erent prices and market shares under competition because their products appeal to di¤erent market segments and, in addition, some …rms have relatively elastic …rm demand (which is why they set relatively low prices). If all …rms were to set the same price then those …rms with more elastic demand would realize a large drop in sales and thus could be worse o¤ than under competition. Or suppose …rms have di¤erent costs. If …rms coordinate on a price above the highest competitive price then the lowest-cost (and lowest-priced) …rms may not …nd it pro…table because their market share has signi…cantly declined; and if they coordinate on a price below the highest competitive price (but above the lowest competitive price) then the highest-cost (and highest-priced) …rms may not …nd it pro…table because their margins are too small. For example, Goto and Iizuka (2014) examined an attempt by medical care providers to coordinate on the price charged for the ‡u vaccine and found that, at every common price, some …rms would be earning lower pro…ts than under competition.
A number of trade associations have pursued a di¤erent simple strategy to promote collusion among their members. Firms are asked to abide by a minimum price; that is, all …rms charge a price at least as high as some minimum level and are otherwise unconstrained. The U.S. Department of Justice pursued a case against the Association of Retail Agents for "organizing a boycott of their members against airlines, hotels, and car rental companies who refused to adhere to ARTA's recommended minimum travel commission levels." 1 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission brought a case against North Texas Specialty Physicians where, among other anti-competitive activities, it had encouraged members to reject fees below some minimum level. 2 The Competition Commission of Singapore pursued a case against 16 bus operators and their trade association for colluding on the price of bus services from Singapore to Malaysia and Southern Thailand. One of the infringements was that the Express Bus Agencies Association announced a minimum selling price.
3 Finally, returning to the ‡u vaccine case mentioned above, the medical association that orchestrated the collusion actually did so by putting forth a minimum recommended price of $38.
The contribution of this paper is to show that, regardless of the extent of …rm heterogeneity, there is always a minimum price that will make all …rms better o¤. Consider a minimum price that lies between the lowest and the highest competitive prices. By causing the lowest-priced …rms to raise their prices to this minimum, it is immediate that all of the higher-priced …rms are better o¤. What is less clear is whether the lowest-priced …rms are better o¤ from having raised their prices. We show there always exists a minimum price such that all …rms, including the lowest-priced …rms, are better o¤. Thus, an appropriately chosen minimum price can result in supracompetitive prices that are sustainable. By A2, the upper bound on price is not a binding constraint in which case i (p i ) < p:
By Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) (hereafter referred to as MR90), these assumptions are su¢ cient to ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium which we denote: e p i p = i e p 1 p ; :::; e p i 1 p ; e p i+1 p e p n p ; for all i = 1; :::; n:
(For purposes of the later analysis, the dependence of equilibrium prices on the minimum price to a …rm's choice set is made explicit.) There may be multiple equilibria. As shown in MR90, there exists a smallest and largest equilibrium where the order is component-wise.
In the ensuing analysis, it is presumed that there is a unique equilibrium or, when there are multiple equilibria, there is a selection of either the smallest or largest. When p = 0, so …rms are not constrained to set a minimum price (only that prices are non-negative), the selected equilibrium price vector is denoted:
(p 1 ; :::; p n ) = (e p 1 (0) ; :::; e p n (0)) :
(p 1 ; :::; p n ) should be thought of as the non-collusive price vector; that is, the prices that would emerge if …rms did not collude. Thus far, assumptions do not ensure that there is an equilibrium in which all …rms have positive demand. One approach at this point would be to impose more structure; for example, assume symmetric demand functions and constant marginal cost that is not too high and does not di¤er too much across …rms. In the spirit of generality, it is instead assumed there is an interior equilibrium and it is heterogeneous. A6 There exists m 2 f1; :::; n 1g such that p 1 = = p m < p m+1 p n :
Result
Now consider the in…nitely repeated game with perfect monitoring for which the stage game is the game described in Section 2. As motivated in the Introduction, I will consider collusion in terms of …rms required to set price at or above some agreed-upon minimum level, which is denoted p. As long as all …rms have always priced at least as high as p, each …rm will continue to abide by the convention of pricing at or above p. If any …rm prices below p, collusion ends and there is a return to static Nash equilibrium prices. 4 More formally, the strategy is
for all j p i otherwise. t = 1; 2; :::; i = 1; :::; n Given that other …rms' future prices are the same as long as …rm i prices at least as high as p; optimality (along the equilibrium path) requires that …rm i choose the price that maximizes current pro…t subject to pricing at least as high as p. Given that must be true for all …rms, it follow from the analysis of Section 2 that equilibrium requires …rm i to price at e p i p . If …rms' discount factors are su¢ ciently close to one then this strategy pro…le is a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as the collusive pro…t exceeds the static Nash equilibrium pro…t:
i e p 1 p ; :::; e p n p > i ; for all i = 1; :::; n:
We now prove that there exists a minimum price whereby that is the case.
Theorem 1 There exists p > p 1 such that i e p 1 p ; :::; e p n p > i ; for all i = 1; :::; n:
Proof. The proof has three steps. First, it is shown that, for a game among only …rms m + 1; :::; n, Nash equilibrium prices are increasing in the prices of …rms 1; :::; m. Second, it is shown that if p 2 p 1 ; p m+1 then the equilibrium prices of …rms m + 1; :::; n are strictly higher compared to p = 0. Third, it is shown that if p is su¢ ciently close to p 1 then pro…ts are strictly higher for …rms 1; :::; m.
As an initial step, de…ne Nash equilibrium for the game among …rms m + 1; :::; n when p = 0 and they take as given prices for …rms 1; :::; m. By Theorem 4 of MR90, a Nash equilibrium exists. Again, any statement with regards to this equilibrium refers to the smallest or largest and the selection is assumed to be the same selection as with (p 1 ; :::; p n ). Note that b p i (p 1 ; :::; p m ) = p i ; i = m + 1; :::; n:
By Theorem 6 of MR90, b p i (p 1 ; :::; p m ) is non-decreasing in p j , j = 1; :::; m. In using Theorem 6 for the game among …rms m + 1; :::; n, we are treating (p 1 ; :::; p m ) as exogenous 4 The particular form of punishment is unimportant for the analysis. 
That is, given …rms 1; :::; m are pricing higher at p 00 and …rm j = m + 1; :::; n (except …rm i) is pricing weakly higher at b p j (p 00 ) , …rm i's pro…t is increasing in its price when evaluated at its original equilibrium price b
; and this holds for all i = m + 1; :::; n.
which implies its pro…t is higher at the new equilibrium price as stated in (1) .
I then just need to derive su¢ cient conditions for the pro…ts of …rms 1; :::; m to be higher. We will show that if p = p 1 + " then i e p 1 p ; :::; e p n p > i ; i = 1; :::; m for " > 0 and su¢ ciently small. Wlog, consider …rm 1. Given the other …rms'new prices, …rm 1's equilibrium pro…t has a lower bound associated with it pricing at p = p 1 + " :
Evaluate at " = 0 : > 0: It then follows that 9" 0 > 0 such that (5) is true 8" 2 (0; " 0 ) :
A minimum price that only binds for the lowest-priced …rms is clearly bene…cial to the other …rms because their lower-priced rivals have raised their prices. The problematic issue is whether the lowest-priced …rms are better o¤. Holding …xed their rival …rms'prices, that is not necessarily the case (and clearly is not the case when m = 1) because the lowest-priced …rms are pricing above their best reply functions. Of course, the rival …rms are not holding their prices …xed but instead are raising their prices because the lowest-priced …rms have raised their prices. This rise in rivals'prices enhances the pro…ts of those …rms which raised their prices to the minimum level.
E¤ectively, the minimum price requirement is causing the lowest-priced …rms to act like Stackelberg leaders. They raise price to satisfy the required minimum and the other …rms respond by raising their prices. The latter is a …rst-order positive e¤ect on the pro…ts of the lowest-priced …rms while the former is a second-order negative e¤ect; hence, the lowest-priced …rms earn higher pro…t.
In conclusion, regardless of the heterogeneity of …rms, there always exists a minimum price such that if …rms price optimally subject to that minimum price constraint then all …rms'pro…ts are higher compared to competition. If …rms are su¢ ciently patient, they can then collude using the convention that all …rms'prices respect some minimum level.
